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Human language serves a number of different functions, one 
of the most prominent being communicating about relevant 
features of the environment. From the point of view of the 
speaker, if the communicated information is advantageous 
for the hearer but not for the speaker, this is an altruistic use 
of language, and, as such, it requires an explanation of its 
evolution. Simon 1990 proposed an explanation of altruism 
in humans based on the genetically inherited ‘docility’ of 
our species. In this paper we present artificial life 
simulations that apply Simon’s ideas to the problem of the 
emergence of the altruistic use of language described above. 
From the point of view of evolutionary theory, the present 
work represents the first attempt to test Simon’s ‘docility’ 
theory of altruism with agent-based computer simulations. 
From the point of view of language evolution, our 
simulations give an original explanation of (the altruistic 
aspect of) human language based on one of its most peculiar 
characteristic, namely, the fact that it is culturally 
transmitted. 
Introduction 
Among the many functions carried out by human language, 
one of the most important is its use to inform another 
individual about some significant feature of the 
environment. It is an open problem whether this use of 
language was the principal function for which human 
language evolved (Bickerton 2002) or language evolution 
started for more social reasons such as facilitating social 
interaction and social coordination (Knight et al. 2000). In 
any case, the use of language for communicating about the 
environment posits a problem for an adaptationist account 
of language evolution. In fact, if what is communicated 
about the environment is useful for the hearer but the act of 
communicating has no advantage for the speaker, sending 
appropriate messages about the environment is an altruistic 
behavior on the part of the speaker. 
In this section we describe various evolutionary 
explanations of altruism, then we briefly review agent-
based simulations that have been used to solve the problem 
of altruistic communication, and finally we describe the 
rationale of the present work. In the next section we 
describe our simulations and their results and, finally, in the 
last section we discuss these results and make some 
conclusive remarks. 
Evolutionary explanations of altruism 
To solve the puzzle of the presence of altruistic behaviors 
in the animal kingdom evolutionary theories have usually 
adopted one (or more) of the following four kinds of 
arguments: reciprocity, kin selection, group selection, and 
cultural selection. 
Arguments based on the concept of reciprocity state that 
if individuals interact repeatedly with each other, then 
altruistic behavior can evolve because the individuals can 
adapt their strategies according to the results of previous 
interactions (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Trivers 1971). 
Kin selection theory (Hamilton 1964) constitutes the 
most unchallenged explanation for the evolution of altruism 
(but see Henrich 2003 and Queller 1992 for some 
interesting discussions). According to this theory, altruistic 
behavior can evolve if the product between the benefit the 
behavior gives to the receiver (B) and the coefficient of 
kin-relatedness between the emitter and the receiver (r) is 
greater than the cost for the emitter (C), as stated by 
Hamilton’s Rule: – C + rB > 0, that is, rB > C. 
Another classical - but more controversial - mechanism 
which has been used for the explanation of the evolution of 
altruistic behaviors is group selection. According to group 
selection theory, if a population is divided into groups 
competing with each other, the total number of altruists in 
the population can increase even though the number of 
altruists inside each group is bound to decrease: the reason 
is that groups with small percentages of altruists will tend 
to disappear in favour of groups with a larger number of 
altruists (Sober and Wilson 1998). 
Finally, some form of cultural evolution (Cavalli-Sforza 
and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerdson 1985) has been 
suggested as a possible explanation of altruistic behavior 
(Richerson et al. 2002; Simon 1990). In particular, Simon’s 
explanation of altruism runs as follows: if cultural learning 
is advantageous for individuals, genetic selection will 
favour docile individuals, that is, individuals that tend to 
learn from others1. Therefore, altruistic behavior can 
                                                           
1 This is not in contradiction with the fact that cultural 
learning is unfrequent in the animal kingdom apart from the 
human species. The reason is that cultural learning requires 
a number of social, cognitive and neural pre-adaptations 
which happened to be present in early hominids but not in 
any other species. 
emerge given that its cost is lower than the benefit of being 
docile and that individuals are not able to distinguish 
between selfish and altruistic behaviors. 
Previous Simulations 
In this section we review very briefly some simulations that 
have focused on the problem we are discussing in this 
paper, that is, the altruistic character of the use of language 
for informing conspecifics about some feature of the 
environment if the information benefits the hearer but not 
the speaker. 
As far as we know, no simulations have been done for 
testing the plausibility of an account of language evolution 
which relies on reciprocal altruism. Simulations by Ackley 
and Littman 1994 and Oliphant 1996 have explored the 
possibility that kin selection could have played a role in the 
evolution of language, but Di Paolo 1999 has criticized this 
work for its improper use of kin-selection. Noble et al. 
2001 explore some other adaptive factors that may be 
relevant for the emergence of a simple signalling system, 
including group selection, sexual selection, and the 
handicap principle (Zahavi 1975). 
In the present work we test yet another possible 
mechanism for the evolutionary explanation of the altruistic 
use of human language which we are dealing with, a 
mechanism which relies on one of the most peculiar 
characteristic of human language, that is, the fact that 
human language is culturally transmitted. 
Docility and the evolution of language 
In Simon’s model the conditions for the evolution of an 
altruistic behavior are the following:  
1) there is some advantage d in being disposed to learn 
from others, i.e., in being docile; 
2) organisms are not able to evaluate the contribution of 
each behavior to their own fitness; 
3) the advantage d of being docile is greater than the cost 
c of the altruistic behavior. 
With his argument Simon intended to show how the 
presence of altruism among human beings should be 
considered differently from the presence of altruism in 
other species in that cultural learning plays a crucial role in 
humans and this makes possible the emergence of altruism 
with a mechanism peculiar to our own species. As the use 
of language that we are dealing with is altruistic and as 
human language is the only communicative system in the 
animal kingdom to be culturally transmitted, Simon’s 
explanation of altruism seems to be applicable to language 
evolution. 
The present work represents the first attempt (to our 
knowledge) to test Simon’s docility theory with agent-
based computer simulations and, at the same time, gives an 
original explanation for the evolution of (the altruistic 
aspect of) human language based on its learned character. 
Simulations 
In order to test the soundness of Simon’s theory with 
respect to the evolution of human language, we ran two 
simulations based on a simplification of the simulative 
scenario used by Cangelosi and Parisi 1998 and discussed 
in Parisi 1997. First, we describe the simulative set-up 
common to both simulations, then we indicate what makes 
the two simulations different, and finally we describe the 
main results of the simulations. 
The simulative set-up 
The population is a succession of 500 generations of 100 
individuals each. In each generation the 20 individuals 
which have the most energy at the end of life are selected 
for reproduction. Each individual generates 5 offspring and 
the 20 × 5 = 100 offspring constitute the next generation2. 
All individuals have the same network architecture but 
connection weights can vary among individuals (see 
below). Each individual lives in its own copy of the 
environment which is a linear succession of 11 cells. At the 
beginning of each ‘epoch’ an individual is placed in the 
first cell while the last cell contains a ‘mushroom’. 
There are 210 edible mushrooms and 210 poisonous 
ones, each different from all the others. The perceptual 
properties of the mushrooms are represented as variations 
from two prototype sequences of ten bits (+1 and –1) each, 
one for the edible mushrooms and one for the poisonous 
mushrooms. The 210 edible mushrooms are the 210 bipolar 
patterns of ten bits which have four +1s (that is, all and 
only the patterns that differ by 4 bits from the prototype 
which has all -1s). The perceptual properties of poisonous 
mushrooms are the 210 bipolar patterns which have six +1 
(those that differ by 4 bits from the prototype which has all 
+1s). If the individual enters the mushroom cell located at 
the end, the individual eats the mushroom. If the mushroom 
is one of the 10 edible mushrooms, the individual’s energy 
is increased by 30 energy units. However, if the mushroom 
is poisonous, its energy is decreased by 5 units. 
Furthermore, an individual’s energy is decreased by 1 unit 
for each step from the initial to the final cell. This is the 
fitness formula: 
f(x) = 30 × number of edible mushrooms eaten - 5 × 
number of poisonous mushrooms eaten - number of steps. 
As the life of each individual last 420 ‘epochs’, one for 
each possible mushroom, the maximum possible fitness will 
be: 
                                                           
2 The results of our simulations are robust with respect to 
changes in most of the simulation’s parameters, including: 
selection algorithm (range-based vs. proportional to 
fitness); use vs. non-use of cross-over; probability of 
mutations; type of mutation (substitution of a weight vs. 
gradual change); presence vs. absence of limits to weights’ 
values; learning rate and momentum values (for the 
simulation with learning). 
FMax = 30 × 210 (edible mushrooms eaten ) – 5 × 0 
(poisonous mushrooms eaten ) – 210 × 10 (steps necessary 
for eating a mushroom) = 6300 – 2100 = 4200 
The organism’s behavior is controlled by a neural 
network with 12 input units, 2 hidden units, and 3 output 
units. Ten input units are ‘visual’ units. If the organism is 
sufficiently near the mushroom, that is, it is in the last but 
one cell of the corridor, the perceptual properties of the 
mushroom are encoded in this set of input units; otherwise, 
the activation of all the visual units is set to zero. The other 
two input units are the linguistic ones: their activity 
depends on the linguistic signal which is produced by 
another individual randomly chosen from the rest of the 
population, the speaker. All the input units are fully 
connected with the two hidden units which in turn are fully 
connected with all three output units. The activation of the 
first output unit is thresholded to a value of either 1, in 
which case the organism moves one step forward, or – 1, in 
which case the organism stays still. The continuous 
activations of the other two output units, in the interval [– 
1; 1], constitutes the signal produced which is copied, when 
the organism acts as a speaker, in the two linguistic input 
units of the hearer. 
We ran two simulations: in the first one, the genome of 
our organisms contains their connection weights, while in 
the second one, the genome is constituted by a single gene, 
the docility gene, which stands for the disposition of the 
organisms to learn from their parents. 
The two conditions: genetic selection and cultural 
selection through docility 
In the first simulation – the “genetic simulation” – the 
values of the connection weights of the initial generation 
are randomly chosen in the range [– 0.5; 0.5], but the 
connection weights of each successive generation are 
inherited from parents to offspring with each weight having 
a probability of 2% to have its value changed by a random 
number in the interval [– 0.5; 0.5]. 
In the second simulation – the “docility simulation” - the 
connection weights of all individuals are always random at 
birth and they are not inherited from parents. Instead, the 
genome of these organisms is constituted by one only gene, 
encoded as an integer number, which stands for an 
individual's ‘docility’, i.e., the number of learning trials for 
that particular individual. In the first generation each 
individual is assigned a random value in the interval [0; 
200] for this gene and this value is genetically transmitted 
with a 2% probability of being changed by adding or 
subtracting a random number in the range [– 100; 100]. In 
any case, docility is forced to stay in the interval [0; 500]. 
The life of organisms in this second simulation is divided 
into two periods: infancy and adulthood. During infancy, 
the organism is supposed to follow its parent and learn 
from it how to behave in different situations. In short, the 
docility gene determines the number of back-propagation 
learning cycles to which the infant exposes itself: the 
learning is imitative in that the teaching input of the back-
propagation algorithm comes from the output of the infant’s 
parent. Since there are three kinds of situations to which 
organisms are exposed during their life, there are also three 
different learning conditions: 1) ‘comprehension learning’, 
2) ‘decision learning’ and 3) ‘naming learning’. 
 Comprehension learning corresponds to the situation in 
which the tested organism is distant from the mushroom 
and has to decide whether to move or not to move 
according only to the signal it receives from another 
organism; decision learning corresponds to the situation in 
which the organism is near the mushroom and so its 
decision whether to move or not to move depends on both 
the visual input and the linguistic input; finally, naming 
learning corresponds to the situation in which the organism 
acts as a speaker: it receives only the perceptual properties 
of a mushroom and has to produce a linguistic signal. 
In short, for each learning cycle determined by one’s 
docility, this is what happens: 
1) one of the three learning situations is randomly chosen 
together with one of the 420 mushrooms; 
2) the appropriate input is given both to the learner and to 
its parent; 
3) both the organism’s output and its parent’s output are 
calculated; 
4) the output of the parent is given to the child as teaching 
input (a random value chosen in the interval +0.25/-
0.25 is added to the teaching input3); 
5) finally, the child’s connection weights are changed 
according to the back-propagation algorithm (with a 
learning rate of 0.3 and a momentum of 0.8). 
After infancy, individuals start adult life, which is identical 
to that of the genetic simulation.  
Results 
We describe the average results of 10 replications of both 
simulations using three measures: language quality, average 
fitness, and average value of the docility gene (in the 
pictures, all values are normalized with respect to their 
maximum possible value). 
This is the way we calculate language quality. A 
linguistic signal is constituted by a vector of two 
continuous numbers in the range [-1; 1] (the vector of 
activation of the linguistic output units of an organism). So, 
a signal can be considered as a point in a bi-dimensional 
Cartesian space. Let’s call E and P the set of points 
(‘clouds’) which represent the signals produced by the 
organisms of one generation in presence of all edible and 
poisonous mushrooms, respectively. A good language is 
one in which the two clouds E and P are 1) small (all 
                                                           
3 The results are robust even with respect to the quantity of 
noise added, provided that this quantity is adequate for 
cultural evolution: if there is no noise, there is no room for 
improvement in behavioral capacity; on the other hand, if 
there is too much noise, good behaviors cannot be 
preserved. All noise values between 0.1 and 0.4 produce 
the same qualitative results.   
mushrooms belonging to the same category are named in 
similar ways) and 2) distant from each other (mushrooms of 
different categories are named in different ways). A 
measure for 1) is the mean distance of the points of a cloud 
from its geometric center; a measure for 2) is the distance 
between the two centers. We normalize those two values in 
the range [0; 1] so that the maximum quality obtainable (1) 
is achieved when each cloud is a single point, in opposite 
corners of the space. In order to plot a single value for each 
simulation, we measure the language quality as the product 
of the two normalized values.4 
 
Figure 1: Average language quality of the genetic (thin line) and  
docility (thick line) simulations as a function of generations. 
As it turns out, the language quality of the genetic 
simulation (fig. 1, thin line) is very bad: in this condition a 
good communication system does not emerge. The reason 
is the altruistic character of the type of communication we 
are dealing with here. Since producing appropriate 
messages (good speaking) gives advantages only to hearers 
but not to speakers, egoists (bad speakers) are selected 
against altruists (good speakers); hence the very low quality 
of language. As a result, the average fitness of the 
organisms of this simulation is sub-optimal. In fact, the 
presence of a good communication system is a necessary 
condition for optimal behavior. Without being told by 
others an organism cannot know which kind of mushroom 
is present at the end of the corridor and has to waste energy 
to go and check by itself. We can also calculate the 
maximal possible fitness for organisms which are not 
helped by language at all: 
 
                                                           
4 The reason for using the product instead of the mean is 
that the product gives high values only if both values are 
high, and this seems quite appropriate. For example, the 
language quality of a communication system in which both 
clouds are collapsed in the same point (all mushrooms are 
named in exactly the same way) is certainly 0: this is in fact 
the value this system would reach using the product of the 
two measures while by using the mean the same system 
would reach the inappropriate value of 0.5. 
FMaxWithoutLanguage = FMax – 210 (poisonous 
mushrooms) × 9 (steps to be made in order to see the 
perceptual properties of the mushroom) = 4200 – 1890 = 
2310 
Figure 2: Average fitness of the genetic (thin line) and docility 
(thick line) simulations as a function of generations. 
If we normalize this quantity, we get 2310 / 4200 = 0.55, 
that is just a little lower than the average fitness reached by 
the genetic simulation, which fluctuates in between 0.6 and 
0.65 (fig. 2, thin line).  
The situation of the docility simulation is very different. 
In this case, there is a strong selective pressure for the 
evolution of docility, since organisms that do not learn 
culturally are bound to behave randomly. As a result, the 
value of the docility gene increases constantly until it 
reaches almost its maximum value (fig. 3). To this increase 
in docility corresponds a parallel increase in the quality of 
the language produced by those organisms, which reaches 
the quite high value of about 0.75 (fig. 1, thick line). As it 
turns out, the correlation between docility and language 
quality is very high: 0,988. As a result, the organisms of 
this simulation can exploit all the advantages given by a 
good communication system and consequently their 
average fitness reaches almost the maximal possible value 
(fig. 2, thick line).  
 
 
Figure 3: Average value of the docility gene of organisms of the 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
There are a number of possible solutions to the problem of 
the evolution of altruism which rely on reciprocity, kin 
selection, group selection or cultural evolution, and we 
think that more than one of these factors may have played a 
role in the evolution of the use of language which is taken 
into consideration in our simulations.  
Pedone and Parisi 1997 have suggested that the crucial 
factor for the evolution of an altruistic behavior is the 
similarity of behavior between interacting individuals. 
Henrich 2003 presents a generalization of Hamilton’s Rule 
which substantiates this suggestion: what really matters for 
the evolution of altruism is the probability for an altruist to 
encounter another one. Consequently, all the theoretical 
solutions to the problem of altruism consist in finding 
plausible mechanisms for maintaining this probability high. 
Our docility simulation strongly confirms Simon’s theory 
according to which docility can be such a mechanism. In 
fact, if docility evolves due to the egoistic advantages it 
confers to organisms, then cultural transmission can 
guarantee the similarity of behaviors necessary for altruism 
to emerge. 
Turning specifically to the evolution of human language, 
our simulations suggest that the use of language for 
informing others about the environment (unless it benefits 
both speaker and hearer in coordinating their behavior, e.g., 
in group hunting) might have emerged relatively lately 
during hominid evolution, namely, after hominids had 
become docile and cultural evolution had started. 
In fact, from the point of view of the informer, this use is 
an altruistic behavior, present in the human species, which 
needs an evolutionary explanation. The results of the 
simulation in which behaviors are genetically inherited 
(through the neural networks’ connection weights) confirm 
the theoretical prediction that in such a condition a good 
communication system does not emerge because of its 
altruistic character. Consider also that in our simulations 
communication is in a sense hardwired: our organisms are 
forced to produce signals for others. So, we are not actually 
dealing with the emergence of communication as such, but 
with the emergence of a good system for communicating 
about the environment. This is justified by the assumption 
that hominids’ proto-language may have initially served 
other, more ‘social’, functions, such as strengthening social 
relationships (Dunbar 1996). This use of language does not 
pose the theoretical problems of altruism, since it is not 
altruistic. 
So, this is the evolutionary scenario we are suggesting. 
First, a very complex social structure created the basis for 
the evolution of the first kind of hominids’ communication 
system which in turn favoured the development of a still 
more complex social structure. Second, this more complex 
social structure constituted one of the preconditions for the 
evolution of cultural learning. Finally, (proto-)language 
started to be used also for informing others about the 
environment. Our simulations show that the 
homogenisation of behavior induced by cultural 
transmission could have favoured the emergence of this 
kind of altruistic use of language. 
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